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The Law-Science Chasm considers the problematic relationship between science and law, with author Cedric
Charles Gilson offering a way to mediate and translate their different perspectives and assumptions. A demanding
read with little light relief, but it is a book that will likely appeal to philosophers of law and of science, as well as
scholars of the law-science relationship who yearn for the degree of theoretical excavation and reconstruction that is
available here, writes Fiona Raitt.
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The relationship between law and science has a strong tradition of
interdependency, matched by an equally robust academic critique of the
relationship, its strengths, frailties and flaws.
The essential aim of Cedric Gilson‘s book is to interrogate the law and science
relationship from a vantage point which positions faulty science as the primary
problem, and converting that to reliable evidence as the goal. As Gilson sees it,
science and law are “functionally differentiated”. They therefore “collide in the
legal forum due to their different constructions of reality, divergent philosophies,
disparate epistemologies and evolution.”
To address this problematic relationship the book is devoted to a detailed
exploration of how systems theory from sociology could be harnessed to
reconcile the law and science disciplines. Gilson’s approach seems to involve bringing science to heel and make it
more amenable to serving law’s needs, in part by asking them to “talk to each other” rather than the present
arrangement whereby he claims they “talk past” each other.
The analysis is undertaken in six chapters and draws heavily on social systems theorists such as Habermas,
Luhmann and Teubner. The complexity of the propositions laid out by the author will be familiar to philosophers of
science or of law, but will not be so readily negotiated by the reader who has picked up the book expecting some
tactical advice on the use of expert scientific evidence in the courtroom.
Following the introduction and methods discussion in chapter1, Chapters 2 and 3 discuss, respectively, disparate
knowledges, and social systems theory. This is where Gilson explores in depth the epistemological issues arising
from the operational difficulties facing law because of the ways that the admissibility of medical and scientific
evidence is determined and interpreted. To illustrate the argument Gilson draws on some well-known legal cases,
such as Bolam and Sally Clark as well as the class actions concerning the thalidomide, and bendectin drugs. Such
examples offer the reader who is less at ease with Gilson’s de-construction and conceptualisation an opportunity to
imagine how his ideas might be applied in practice.
Chapters 4 and 5 consider some of the large scale public health controversies which the author characterises as
“contemporary crises of science in society”. These range from the MMR vaccine to Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis
(BSE) and shaken baby syndrome. Gilson regards this mixed bag of issues as poised in a state of trans-science,
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comprising science that is ‘sub-scientific’ or ‘extra-scientific’ and thus dangerous if introduced in law “as they may
transgress the boundaries of true science or even are not sufficiently known to science.” This description of Trans-
science is unduly negative. More familiar depictions of this entity would describe them as emerging science, or
science in its infancy, to convey the sense of their relatively early evolution within their fields but nonetheless their
qualification as science. Such science undoubtedly has the scope to be high risk, but may equally be of considerable
value provided it has been validated and its status fully acknowledged. An example that comes to mind is the use of
techniques in forensic anthropology that enable identification of perpetrators in online sexual abuse through
capturing digital images of the abuser’s hands. (see S.M Black et aI., “Forensic Hand Image Comparison as an aid
for Paedophile Investigations”,(2009) 185 Police Professional 21.
The thrust of the book’s critique suggests there is something inherently problematic about the uncertain state of
science, which may be unnecessarily defeatist. An alternative approach is to acknowledge that instability is the
natural state of science and then focus on improving the methods law invokes to ensure that only reliable evidence
is admissible. At least that approach would limit the potential for misleading conclusions to be reached in public
policy decisions or in litigation outcomes. Admittedly that alternative approach would mean a resort to conventional
adversarial practice which is probably indifferent to the potential for sociology and systems theories to resolve its
issues with science. Gilson frequently invokes legal practice though, specifically the merits of law in its assumed
capability to elicit truth though adversarial processes. It is curious therefore that he does not make more of the
deeply contested concept of “truth” or whether cross-examination is as good as it is professed to be at obtaining said
truth, especially as his thesis centres on the constructed nature of law.
The final chapter 6 brings the argument together with some practical suggestions of methods that could bridge the
gap between the two disciplines, such as alternative dispute resolution options, though it should be noted that these
too have shortcomings.
Towards the end of the book there is a reference to exchanges in 2005 between Professor Alec Jeffreys, a
renowned expert on fingerprint evidence, and members of the House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee, on the vexed question of the reliability of fingerprint evidence. Jeffreys argued pragmatically for stronger
criteria to enhance reliability when determining a match. Six years later the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry altered
practice overnight when it recommended that fingerprints should no longer be treated as evidence of fact, but only
as evidence of opinion. That small legal re-categorisation constituted a huge impact to the status of the science.
Change can therefore contribute greatly to the uncertainty of the status quo and represents a ceaseless challenge to
those engaged in law and science endeavours. In whatever ways participants undertake those endeavours they will
learn something from this book. It is a demanding read with little light relief, but it is a book that will likely appeal to
philosophers of law and of science, as well as scholars of the law-science relationship who yearn for the degree of
theoretical excavation and reconstruction that is available here.
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